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Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of
HIV: An International Analysis
By THOMAS W. TiERNEY*
Member of the Class of 1992
I. INTRODUCTION
In the absence of a cure, public health authorities maintain that pub-
lie education and counseling about the modes of transmission and meth-
ods of reducing risk, not the criminal law, should be the foremost
strategy for preventing the transmission and spread of the human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV).' At the same time, public health authorities
and legislators are concerned that certain individuals, knowing that they
are infected with HIV, may disregard the risk they pose to others.2 It is
conceivable that some people may deliberately engage in behavior that
exposes others to HIV.3 When individuals threaten the health of others
by such behavior, it has been urged that governments consider criminal
prosecutions as an appropriate response when efforts to obtain voluntary
compliance have failed.'
This Note begins by examining some of the medical facts relating to
HIV infection. The Note then explores some of the arguments for and
against the use of the criminal law to limit the spread of HIV. It com-
pares criminal laws relating to the HIV epidemic in the United States,
Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Finally, this Note suggests
that the traditional criminal approach is inappropriate when dealing with
conduct capable of transmitting HIV, and proposes elements for a special
* B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1987.
1. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INSTrrUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH
CARE, AND RESEARCH 9-13 (1986) [hereinafter CONFRONTING AIDS].
2. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACAD-
EMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS UPDATE 1988, 83 (1988) [hereinafter CONFRONTING
AIDS UPDATE].
3. See generally Mary Ann Galante, AIDS' Expanding Legal Frontier, NAT. LJ., Feb. 3,
1986, at 3.
4. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACAD-
EMY OF SCIENCES, MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS 187, 188 (1989) [hereinafter MOBILIZING
AGAINST AIDS].
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HIV-specific criminal statute that takes into account: the unique charac-
teristics of HIV.
II. MEDICAL FACTS REGARDING HIV
TRANSMISSION
Before beginning an analysis of the substantive criminal law relating
to HIV transmission, it is necessary to examine the current medical con-
sensus regarding several different aspects of the HIV epidemic in order to
make an informed analysis of these laws and the activities they proscribe.
A. Terminology
HIV5 is a virus that attacks and damages the immune system. 6 It
was first identified in the early 1980s.7 Physicians and scientists have
identified at least two strains of HIV: HIV-1 (commonly called HIV),
which is prevalent in the U.S. and most of the world,' and HIV-2, which
is common in parts of West Africa.9 Most of the illnesses associated with
HIV are "opportunistic infections" that take advantage of a person's
weakened immune system, but there are some diseases that are caused by
the virus itself.10
There are three basic means of transmitting HIV. They are trans-
mission by injection of infected blood, by unprotected sex with an in-
fected person, and from an infected mother to her fetus or newborn child
(perinatally). 1
The most common method of determining whether a person is in-
fected with HIV is to test his or her blood for antibodies to the virus. 12 If
antibodies are found, the person is said to be "HIV-positive." However,
the tests are not foolproof."3
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a medical and
5. Earlier acronyms for HIV include: HTLV-III (human T-cell lymphotropic virus type
three) and LAV (lymphadenopathy-associated virus). Id. at 101.
6. Id. at 116.
7. See June E. Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: Discovery of a New Disease, in AIDS AND
THE LAW 17, 18 (Harlan L. Dalton & Scott Burris eds., 1987).
8. CONFRONTING AIDS UPDATE, supra note 2, at 123-27. This Note will use the term
HIV to denote HIV-1.
9. Jay A. Levy, Human Immunodeficiency Viruses and the Pathogenesis of AIDS, 261
JAMA 2997, 3003 (1989).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 28-31.
11. See Levy, supra note 9, at 2999-3000.
12. S. Sheppard, Medical and Public Health Overview of HIV In~fection, in AIDS PRAC-
TICE MANUAL: A LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL GUIDE 2-25 (Paul Albert et al. eds., 1991).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 47-60.
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legal term defined by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta,
Georgia. It refers to a specific group of conditions that develop after the
function of the immune system has declined substantially due to LIV
infection.' 4 This definition has been criticized as arbitrary because many
people die as a result of HIV without ever suffering from any of the dis-
eases or conditions specified in the CDC definition of AIDS."5
LILV-positive people suffering from intense symptoms, but ones not
meeting the CDC definition of AIDS, have been said to suffer from
AIDS-Related Complex (ARC). This term has recently been described
as "no longer useful" by public health authorities, who believe that HIV
infection itself should be considered a spectrum disease.16
B. Epidemiology
As of December 31, 1991, there were 206,392 confirmed cases of
AIDS reported in the United States, resulting in over 133,232 reported
deaths.17 The CDC has estimated that at least one million people in the
United States are infected with HIV.'8 As of January 1, 1991, the World
Health Organization had reported 3,884 AIDS cases in Great Britain,
4,427 in Canada, 2,295 in Australia, and 207 in New Zealand. 9
Men who have had sex with other men20 and intravenous drug users
now make up 83% of the reported AIDS cases in the United States.2"
Women constitute 12% of adults with AIDS in the United States.2 Pe-
diatric cases (children under age 13) form over 1.7% of all cases. People
14. See Centers for Disease Control [hereinafter CDC], Revision of the CDC Surveillance
Case Definition of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 36 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT [hereinafter M. M. WKLY. REP.] IS (Supp. 1987).
15. Sheppard, supra note 12, at 2-4. The CDC and Social Security Administration are
planning to change and expand the definition of AIDS after a public comment period ends in
mid-February 1992. See Mireya Navarro, Agencies Slowed in Effort to Widen Definitions of
AIDS, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 10, 1992, at Al.
16. CONFRONTING AIDS UPDATE, supra note 2, at 3. A "spectrum disease" is "a contin-
uum of conditions associated with immune dysfunction." IR
17. CDC, The Second 100,000 Cases of Aquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United
States, June 1981 - Dec. 1991, 41 M. M. WKLY. REP. 28 (1992).
18. CDC, Estimates of HIVPrevalence and Projected AIDS Cases: Summary of a Work-
shop, Oct 31-Nov. 1, 1989, 39 M. M. WKLY. REP. 110, 111 (1990) [hereinafter CDC, HIV
Prevalence Workshop].
19. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS ANNUAL 1990, at
33-34 (1991).
20. The term "men who have had sex with other men" is used in this Note because the
term "gay men" is underinclusive. Many men who are infected with HIV as a result of having
sex with other men do not identify themselves as "gay" or even "bisexuaL"
21. CDC, HIV/AIDS Epidemic The First Ten Years, 40 M. M. Wkly. Rep., 357, 362
(1991) [hereinafter CDC, HIV/AIDS Epidemic].
22. Id.
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of color make up 48% of the reported AIDS cases in the United States.23
By the end of 1993, it is estimated that there will have been between
390,000 and 480,000 cases of AIDS in the United States, and two-thirds
of these cases will have resulted in death. 24 The World Health Organiza-
tion estimates that at least 9 million people worldwide are infected with
HIV, a number which will rise to 40 million by the year 2000.25 New
AIDS cases are increasing at a much higher rate among heterosexual
men than among homosexual or bisexual men.26 In addition, the impact
of AIDS on women, the poor, and people of color will increase, as the
number of HIV-infected people from these groups grows dramatically.27
C. Disease Process
HIV invades cells vital to the body's ability to defend against dis-
ease,2s especially T4 (T-helper) cells which "directly or indirectly regu-
latel] every aspect of immune function."29 The virus destroys these cells
and may even suppress the production of new T4 cells. The virus infects
a T4 cell, replicates itself, and those replications in turn infect an ever
increasing number of T4 cells.3"
Impairment or destruction of T4 cells results in a weakening of the
immune system, leaving the body susceptible to infection. Familiar in-
fections which normally would not be cause for concern may become
extremely difficult to treat.3" These infections (or certain types of can-
cers) give rise to a diagnosis of AIDS. Studies indicate that the median
survival time for people with AIDS is 12.5 months after an AIDS diag-
nosis but that many people have lived with AIDS for as long as 8 years.32
In many people, HIV remains relatively inactive for a significant
period of time before causing clinical symptoms or signs. This period of
latency or dormancy may last anywhere from two months to seven
23. Id
24. CDC, HIVPrevalence Workshop, supra note 18, at 117.
25. CDC, HIV1AIDS Epidemic, supra note 21, at 357.
26. Id at 358-59.
27. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACAD-
EMY OF SCIENCES, AIDS: THE SECOND DECADE 38-80 (1990).
28. See generally MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 4, at 112-43 (describing which
cells the virus invades and its effects on the immune system).
29. Id. at 123.
30. Id. at 117.
31. Sheppard, supra note 12, at 2-8.
32. See, eg., George F. Lemp et al., Survival Trends for Patients with AIDS, 263 JAMA
402, 403 (1990). Drug treatments may prolong the lives of people with AIDS, so the survival
periods should increase as new drugs are developed. See infra text azcompanying notes 61-71.
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years.33 During this time, a person has no way of knowing that he or she
is infected, unless a test yields positive results.
It is unclear what triggers viral activity after this period of dor-
mancy. Experts speculate that triggers may include exposure to other
infectious agents (such as herpes or other sexually transmitted diseases),
repeated exposure to HIV, genetic factors, and behavioral habits or other
environmental factors.'
D. Symptoms and Diseases
1. Symptoms
Within a month of HIV infection, some people experience flu-like
symptoms. These symptoms may last from a few days to several weeks,
and include fevers, sweats, exhaustion, nausea, headaches, swollen lymph
glands, diarrhea, and loss of appetite.35 Most patients and doctors do not
initially recognize the symptoms as being indicative of HIV, however,
because they are non-specific and could result from other causes. In ad-
dition, many people remain symptom-free during the initial period after
infection.3 6 Even if a person experiences these initial symptoms, they are
commonly followed by a long period during which the patient is asymp-
tomatic (infected with HIV but showing no symptoms of infection).3 7
The type, severity, and onset of HIV symptoms vary greatly among
lIV-infected people.38 When they finally develop symptoms, there are
several conditions that may be quite severe and even deadly, but still do
not constitute an AIDS diagnosis under the CDC definition. These
symptoms are: persistently swollen lymph glands throughout the body,
thrush, shingles, drenching night sweats, and sudden, unexplained
weight loss ("wasting syndrome"). 3 9
2. Diseases
The most common diseases that result in a diagnosis of full-blown
AIDS are Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP), Karposi's sarcoma
(KS), and IRY encephalopathy ("AIDS dementia complex"), but several
33. MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 4, at 131-32.
34. Alan R. Lifson et al., The Natural History of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infec-
tion, 158 J. INFEcrIous DISEAsES 1360, 1364-65 (1988).
35. MOBILIZING AGAiNST AIDS, supra note 4, at 59-60.
36. Id at 131-32.
37. Id
38. See Lifson, supra note 34, at 1362-63.
39. Id See also MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 4, at 62.
1992]
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other diseases are also relatively common.' PCP is a parasitic pneumo-
nia characterized by difficulty in breathing, dry cough, fever, and chest
tightness." It is the most common "life-threatening infection" for peo-
ple with AIDS in the United States.42 KS is a cancer of the blood vessel
walls which, when seen externally, is distinguished by blue-violet to
brownish skin blotches or bumps, but it may also affect internal organs 43
AIDS dementia complex is a degenerative brain disease caused by a di-
rect infection of the brain by HIV.4 Early symptoms include diminished
concentration, mild memory loss, abnormal motor function, and behav-
ioral problems.45 These symptoms vary from mild to severe, and gener-
ally worsen over time. In acute cases, seizures, incontinence, partial
paralysis, profound memory loss, and psychotic behavior may result. 6
E. Testing
HIV itself may be directly detected by testing blood for the DNA of
the virus, using a test called the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test.47
This test is extremely sensitive, but very expensive, so it is primarily used
for research.48
The most commonly used tests to detect HIV infection are the an-
tibody tests4 9 which detect antibodies formed in reaction to exposure to
HIV, rather than the DNA of the virus itself.5 Antibodies generally
become detectable between two and four months after exposure.51 About
95% of infected individuals will register antibody positive within six
months of exposure to HIV.5 2 Tests taken during the "window" period
40. MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 4, at 65-80.
41. Id at 66.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 74-75. More than 95% of AIDS patients with KS are men who have had sex
with other men. Id
44. Id at 63.
45. Id
46. Id
47. C. Robert Horsburgh, Jr. et al., Duration of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection
Before Detection of Antibody, 2 LANCET 637, 637 (1989).
48. Sheppard, supra note 12, at 2-25.
49. The antibody test is frequently called the "AIDS test," a misnomer that falsely
equates HIV antibody positivity with AIDS.
50. The immune system will usually form antibodies to rid the body of viruses and other
foreign substances. Unfortunately, antibodies to HIV are not successful in eliminating the
virus from the body. However, they are helpful as markers for inrection. See MOBILIZING
AGAINST AIDS, supra note 4, at 291-94.
51. Horsburgh, supra note 47, at 638.
52. Id at 639. One study even documented that in some cases thirty-five months passed
between exposure and seroconversion. David T. Imagawa et al., IHuman Immunodeficlency
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between exposure and seroconversion (the time when antibodies to HIV
become detectable in the blood) may yield negative results, even though a
person is actually infected. The degree to which this person can infect
others during this period is unknown."
The initial screening test for antibodies to HIV is the enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay (ELISA)l because of its low cost and ease of
use.5 The cutoff point for a test to be considered "positive" is purposely
set low so that faint specimens are labelled positive. The low cutoff point
protects the blood supply (by eliminating such blood from blood banks)
and increases the chance of detecting HIV infection despite a weak an-
tibody response.56 However, this low cutoff point also increases the
chance for "false positive" results, which are samples that do not contain
antibodies but nevertheless produce a positive reaction to the test. 7
Because of the social stigma attached to positive test results, public
health officials recommend additional testing in most of these cases."
The current practice following an initial positive ELISA test is to require
a repeat ELISA. If the repeat also registers positive, a more sophisti-
cated antibody test, such as the western blot or PCR test, is used to con-
firm the result.59 The CDC will only consider a person to be HIV-
positive if the more sophisticated test also indicates the presence of
antibodies."
F. Treatment
Progress has occurred both in delaying or preventing the onset of
symptoms and in treating the opportunistic infections and cancers associ-
ated with AIDS. The use of the anti-viral drug zidovudine (AZT) by
asymptomatic individuals has been shown to be effective in staving off
further decline,6 1 although the virus may develop resistance to AZT over
time.62 In addition, although its effectiveness has not yet been estab-
Virus Type 1 Infection in Homosexual Men Who Remain Seronegative for Prolonged Periods,
320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1458, 1458 (1989).
53. Imagawa, supra note 52, at 1461.
54. See MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 4, at 291-92.
55. CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 1, at 113.
56. Id
57. Id at 113-14.
58. Id at 114.
59. MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 4, at 292.
60. Id
61. See Gerald H. Friedland, Early Treatment for HIrV The 77me Has Come, 322 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1000 (1990); Paul H1 Volberding et al., Zidovudine in Asymptomatic Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 941 (1990).
62. See Margaret A. Fischl et al., Prolonged Zidovudine Therapy in Patients With AIDS
19921
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lished, AZT is being administered to employees in some hospitals after
occupational exposure to HIV.63 Drugs such as aerosolized pentamidine
have been shown to prevent initial and recurrent episodes of PCP."
During the summer of 1991, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved a new anti-viral drug called dideoxyinosine (ddl) that has been
shown to increase the number of T4 cells in people being administered
the drug.65 It also appears to be less toxic than AZT and has been shown
to be effective against AZT-resistant strains of HIV. 66
However, none of the drugs yet discovered arc the magic cure for
people with HIV or AIDS. AZT causes some severe side effects, primar-
ily anemia, in some patients, especially those who are already ill.67 After
twelve to thirty-six months, people taking AZT often show increasing
viral resistance to the drug. 68 The side effects of other drugs are still
largely unknown.
No effective vaccine or cure for HIV infection is likely to be avail-
able for several years.69 Discouraging results from animal studies, as
well as legal, social, and ethical obstacles, suggest that the development
of a vaccine will be a difficult and time-consuming process. 70 As a result,
"many researchers hope to be able to ultimately describe HIV disease as




1. Major Modes of Transmission
HIV infection is primarily a sexually transmitted disease, and un-
protected anal and vaginal sex are the activities most commonly associ-
ated with HIV transmission.7" If the virus is present in semen it can
and Advanced AIDS-Related Complex, 262 JAMA 2405, 2409 (1989); Anthony S. Fauci,
ddI--A Good Start, But Still Phase I, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1386, 1386 (1990).
63. See Josep M.A. Lange et al., Failure of Zidovudine Prophylaxis After Accidental Expo-
sure to HIV-1, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1375 (1990).
64. Jeffrey A. Golden et al., Prevention of Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia by Inhaled
Pentamidine, 1 LANCET 654, 656 (1989).
65. Fauci, supra note 62, at 1387.
66. Id. at 1386-87.
67. Margaret A. Fischl et al., The Safety and Efficacy of Zidovudine (AZT) in the Treat-
ment of Subjects with Mildly Symptomatic Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I (HIV) In-
fection: A Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial, 112 ANNALS INT. MED. 727, 736 (1990).
68. Fischl, supra note 62, at 2409; Fauci, supra note 62, at 1386.
69. See MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 4, at 223-34.
70. Id. at 223.
71. Sheppard, supra note 12, at 2-24.
72. See MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 4, at 26-33.
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enter the body through breaks in the skin or through the mucous mem-
branes in the vagina, rectum, and perhaps even the mouth (although the
mouth is a significantly less effective transmission route). 3 While male-
to-female transmission is much more common, women may spread HV
to partners during intercourse through vaginal secretions or menstrual
blood.74 HIV cannot pass through unbroken latex condoms, but the
problems of breakage and improper use that make condoms less than
100% effective in preventing pregnancy also reduce the effectiveness of
condoms in preventing HIV transmission."
HIV is also spread through shared needles during intravenous drug
use.76 Cleaning needles with a bleach solution appears to be effective in
inactivating the virus. Therefore, experts suggest that successful educa-
tion campaigns must urge needle users both to refrain from sharing and
to clean their needles with bleach.'
Children with HIV are most often infected perinatally. The virus is
either transmitted from mother to child during pregnancy, at the time of
delivery, or shortly after birth (most likely through breast feeding).7
Data suggests that there is only a twenty-five to fifty percent chance of
transmission from infected mother to infant.7 9
All blood donated in the United States has been tested for HIV since
mid-1985, when the HIV antibody test first became widely available. As
a result, since 1985 the risk of infection from blood transfusions has been
73. See Lawrence A. Kingsley et al., Risk Factors for Seroconversion to Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Among Male Homosexuals, I LANcET 345, 348 (1987) ("The absence of
detectable risk for seroconversion due to receptive oral-genital intercourse is striking."). On
the other hand, there is some debate whether the number of sexual partners is a risk factor.
See Andrew R. Moss et al., Risk Factors for AIDS and HIVSeropositivity in Homosexual Men,
125 AM. J. EPIDEMIoLoGY 1035, 1045 (1987) ("AIDS risk was strongly associated with
number of sexual partners"); Nancy Padian et al., Male-to-Female Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 JAMA 788, 790 (1987) ("number of sexual partners was not a
risk associated with HIV infection").
74. 1L Hunter Handsfield, Heterosexual Transmission of HIV, 260 JAMA 1943, 1943
(1988) ("female-to-male transmission of HIV may be less efficient than transmission from men
to women"). See also Harry W. Haverkos & Robert Edelman, The Epidemiology of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome Among Heterosexuals, 260 JAMA 1922, 1927 (1988).
75. CDC, Condoms for Prevention of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 37 M. M. WKLY.
REP. 133, 134 (1988).
76. Elie E. Shoenbaum et al., Risk Factors for Human Immunodeficlency Virus Infection
in Intravenous Drug Users, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 874 (1989).
77. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, AIDS: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND INTRAVENOUS DRUG USE 193-95 (1989).
78. MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 4, at 42.
79. IM at 44. See also Samuel L. Katz & Catherine M. Wilfert, Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Infection of Newborns, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1687, 1688 (1989).
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extremely low.0
2. Casual Contact
HIV is not spread by casual contact and is not contagious in the
sense that it is not easily transmitted."1 It is not spread by droplets in the
air, surface-to-skin contact, or skin-to-skin contact."2 HIV is extremely
fragile and cannot survive outside the human body. 3
The history of the epidemic confirms the extremely remote chance
of casual transmission. Not one case has been reported of HIV transmis-
sion through air, tears, sweat, or urine.8 4 No evidence of infection
through bites by mosquitoes, other insects, or animals currently exists."
Finally, human bites, even in cases where the skin has been broken, have
not resulted in any documented cases of transmission. 86 However, as
Doctors Friedland and Klein have noted, "[a]n unrealistic requirement
for absolute certainty about the lack of transmission by other routes [be-
sides unprotected sex, needle sharing, and perinatal transmission] per-
sists, despite the knowledge that it is not scientifically possible to prove
that an event cannot occur."'87
3. Exposure to HIV
While the modes of HIV transmission are well-documented, it is not
clear how "efficiently" HIV is transmitted during an exposure. Even an
instance of direct exposure through needle sharing or unprotected sex
does not necessarily result in transmission. 8 Researchers have calcu-
lated that the probability of a female seroconverting because of a single
act of unprotected heterosexual intercourse with an infected male is
about one in five hundred. 9 The probability that an exposure will result
80. See Paul D. Cumming et al., Exposure of Patients to Human Immunodeficlency Virus
Through the Transfusion of Blood Components That Test Antibody-Negative, 321 NEW ENO. J.
MED. 941 (1989). The risk that exists is that the donor was in the "window" period between
exposure and the formation of antibodies. See Imagawa, supra note 52, at 1458.
81. See Alan R. Lifson, Do Alternative Modes for Transmission of Human Inmu-
nodeficiency Virus Exist?, 259 JAMA 1353 (1989).
82. Id. at 1354-55.
83. Sheppard, supra note 12, at 2-11.
84. Lifson, supra note 81, at 1355.
85. Id.
86. Id at 1353-54. See also Chris M. Tsoukas et al., Lack of Transmission of HIV
Through Human Bites and Scratches, 1 J. A.I.D.S. 505 (1988).
87. Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1133 (1987).
88. CONFRONTING AIDS UPDATE, supra note 2, at 42-44.
89. Norman Hearst & Stephen B. Hulley, Preventing the Heterosexual Spread of AIDS
Are We Giving Our Patients the Best Advice?, 259 JAMA 2428, 2429 (1988).
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in transmission depends upon a number of factors, including the amount
of virus involved. 90 For example, since the amount of HV present in
saliva is extremely low, saliva has not been implicated in HIV transmis-
sion,91 even though the possibility has been studied extensively.92
H. Containment of the Epidemic
Public health authorities insist that education about the modes of
transmission and methods of reducing risk should be the preeminent
strategy for controlling this epidemic. 93 According to the General Ac-
counting Office, there is a consensus among public health officials that
the criminal law is not an effective means of controlling the spread of
HIV, but "education and prevention activities are the most powerful
tools available to reduce the potential impact of the AIDS epidemic.'9 4
Unfortunately, education programs are often in conflict with legal
and moral prohibitions on the activities through which the virus is trans-
mitted. Many people object to teaching gay men and teenagers how to
have sex safely because they believe that these individuals should not be
having sex at all.95 In fact, several states still have laws making sodomy
a crime.96 In addition, many people oppose education of drug users on
the grounds that such efforts encourage illegal activity.
90. Levy, supra note 9, at 3000.
91. CDC, Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings,
36 M. M. WXIY. REP. 6S (Supp. 1987).
92. See, eg., David D. Ho et al., Infrequency of Isolation of HTLV-I1 Virus from Saliva
in AIDS, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1606 (1985).
93. See generally CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 1, at 9-12.
94. GENERAL AccOUNTING OFFIcE, AIDS PREVENTION: VIEWS ON THE ADMINISTRA-
TION'S BUDGET PROPOSALS 2, 4 (1987).
95. Sheppard, supra note 12, at 2-16 to 2-17.
96. At least 28 states and the District of Columbia have statutes criminalizing consensual
adult sodomy. These statutes are: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(aX3) (1982 & Supp. 1991); ARz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1987 & Supp.
1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1989 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West
1976 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-6605 (1987 & Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1988 & Supp. 1991); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:89 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 272, § 34 (Law. Co-op 1980); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.355, .356 (Callaghan 1990); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); MISs. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1973 &
Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-505 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.190 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. PE-
NAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1986 & Supp. 1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-12 (1985 & Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983
& Supp. 1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124 (1983 & Supp. 1991); IL. GEN. LAWS § I1-
10-1 (1981 & Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1991);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1989 & Supp.
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This Note's analysis of the criminal law and HIV is framed against
this background of the medical facts, including the modes of transmitting
HIV, and the consensus in the public health community that education is
central in preventing the spread of the virus.
I. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE USE OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW TO PREVENT THE
SPREAD OF HIV
One purpose of criminal law is to punish those persons who violate
the law.9 7 Another objective is to deter criminal acts.98 The criminal law
therefore provides a means both to educate and to reinforce norms of
social behavior.99
Thus, the passage of rules and penalties aimed at preventing the
spread of HIV realizes the purposes underlying criminal law. At least
one commentator has argued rather persuasively that those persons who
purposefully violate laws intended to prevent HIV-transmitting conduct
deserve to be punished. 100 Moreover, just as other individuals in society
are held responsible for their actions when they violate the minimum
standards of behavior set by criminal law, HIV-infected individuals who
engage in conduct which they know significantly exposes others to HIV
infection should be held accountable for their actions. 101 Accountability
is justified because of the severe consequences of HIV infection.10 2
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1988 &
Supp. 1991).
97. See Baer, Is Punishment Retributive?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 131-32
(Harry B. Acton ed., 1969).
98. See Johannes Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality, 43 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 176 (1952).
99. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PRODS.
401 (1958).
100. See Donald H.J. Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 351, 352 (1990).
101. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY
VIRUS EPIDEMIC 130 (1988) [hereinafter REPORT]. In addition, to ensure that individuals
who engage in high risk behavior are held accountable, the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS
Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-381, § 2647, 10t Stat. 576, 603, requires
that states which apply for federal assistance in providing medical care to HIV-infected per-
sons warrant that their criminal statutes could prosecute a person who has been informed of
his or her HIV infection and who either donates blood, semen, or breast milk; engages in
sexual activity; or shares hypodermic needles with intent to expose another person to HIV,
However, the Act does not require the enactment of HIV-specific statutes, only that a state has
adequate criminal statutes to prosecute such conduct.
102. Linda K. Burdt & Robert S. Caldwell, Note, The Real Fatal Attraction: Civil and
Criminal Liability for the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 657, 695 (1988).
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Laws proscribing HIV-transmitting conduct also fulfill important
social objectives. Ideally, they prevent conduct likely to transmit HIV to
uninfected people, educate the public about activities likely to spread
HIV, and reinforce social norms against behavior that risks IV trans-
mission."°3 To be effective, however, such laws must be clear in their
content and only proscribe behavior that poses a serious public health
risk."4 Unclear laws proscribing more than just behavior that poses a
serious public health risk not only frustrate efforts to educate the public
about AIDS, they also promote discrimination against HIV-infected
persons. 1
0 5
Nevertheless, many people question whether the benefits of criminal
laws that outlaw conduct relating to the transmission of HIV outweigh
their costs, even if the laws could be closely tailored to forbid only those
activities likely to transmit HIV. Using the criminal law to stem HIV
transmission may be counterproductive in that it may encourage individ-
uals to eschew testing to avoid establishing a basis for subsequent crimi-
nal liability." 6 HIV transmission laws may also foster an adversarial
relationship between the public health system and HIV-infected people,
103. Hermann, supra note 100, at 352-53.
104. See Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS Compulsory State Powe, Public Health, and
Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 1017, 1038 (1989).
105. See Susan Hendricks, Problems and Issues in Criminal Prosecutions, in AIDS PxAC-
TICE MANUAL supra note 12, at 13-1, 13-19 to 13-20. There have been several convictions for
attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon for conduct that has been demonstrated
not to transmit HIV (usually biting or spitting). See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
Nevertheless, appellate courts have usually upheld these convictions on appeal. See, eg.,
United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988) (biting by HIV-infected prisoner of
prison guards supported conviction for assault with deadly or dangerous weapon); State v.
Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (evidence that defendant with ARC spat at, bit,
scratched, and threw blood at police and paramedics who thwarted his suicide attempt sup-
ported conviction for attempted murder); State v. Cummings, 153 Wis. 2d 603, 451 N.W.2d
463 (Ct. App. 1989) (bite by HIV-infected prisoner constituted battery of correction officer);
State v. Weeks, No. 15-183, (Tex. Dist. Ct., Walker Cty., Nov. 4, 1989) (evidence that HIV-
infected prisoner spat at prison guard resulted in life sentence for murder conviction).
These types of convictions surely fuel the misinformation, hysteria, and discrimination
surrounding the HIV epidemic, and hurt the criminal law's social objective of educating the
public, because they punish behavior that does not risk transmitting HIV. In fact, it has been
estimated that one quart of HIV-infected saliva would have to enter the bloodstream of an
individual for infection to occur. THEODORE M. HAMMETT, AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FA-
CILITIEs: IssuES AND OPTIONS 16 (1988). The commentators have been nearly universal in
their criticism of the Moore case. See, e-g., Robert Lewis Stauter, United States v. Moore:
AIDS and the Criminal Law, The Witch Hunt Begins, 22 AKRON L REV. 503 (1989); Carlton
D. Stansbury, Note, Deadly and Dangerous Weapons and AIDS: The Moore Analysis Is Likely
to Be Dangerous, 74 IowA L. Rlv. 951 (1989). In Moore, the circuit court repeatedly mixed
up AIDS and HIV, infection and antibodies, illustrating that the criminal law in this area is
not even educating judges, much less the public.
106. See MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 4, at 153.
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thereby discouraging them from seeking treatment.10 7 Therefore, public
health authorities insist that public education about the modes of trans-
mission, and not the criminal law, should be the foremost strategy for
controlling this epidemic.108
Furthermore, use of criminal laws to control the spread of HIV ig-
nores the traditional failure of the criminal law to compel changes in
human sexual behavior.' 9 Criminal laws threaten massive government
intrusion into sexual privacy." 0 For example, if a complainant has re-
cently had sex with partners other than the defendant, the complainant's
other sexual partners would also be subject to investigation and surveil-
lance, in order to rule out sources of infection other than the suspect.
Therefore, sexual surveillance, as part of the criminal law, would surely
encompass a great deal of sexual activity that presents no threat of harm
to others in pursuit of the few instances of sexual activity that do. Such a
law would sweep too broadly."' Moreover, the Supreme Court has said
that government should not be in the business of intruding upon an indi-
vidual's right to privacy in sexual relationships."'
The right to sexual privacy, however, is not absolute. 113 Courts
have refused to recognize privacy rights of sexual partners as a barrier to
criminal convictions arising from sexual conduct even in marriage."14
Therefore, the privacy interests of an HIV-infected person engaging in
conduct likely to transmit HIV may be outweighed by the interest that
the public and the sexual partner have in preventing the spread of HIV
infection." 5
Finally, criminal laws proscribing behavior likely to transmit HIV
may be enforced selectively because such statutes will likely give enforce-
ment discretion to police and prosecuting authorities. 1 6 Experts assert
107. Martha A. Field & Kathleen M. Sullivan, AIDS and the Criminal Law, 15 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 46, 55 (1987).
108. See generally CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 1, at 9-13.
109. See Gostin, supra note 104, at 1019, 1041.
110. Field & Sullivan, supra note 107, at 54.
111. Id
112. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564-68 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
113. Sallyanne K. Sullivan, Comment, Imposing Criminal Liability on Those Who Know-
ingly Transmit the AIDS Virus:. A Recommendation for Legislative Action, 13 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 489, 498 (1988).
114. See, e.g., State v. Bateman, 547 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976) (Arizona
Supreme Court upheld a husband's conviction for forcing his wife to perform fellatio on him
despite a constitutional claim of a right to privacy by the husband).
115. See Adrian Lynch, Criminal Liability for Transmitting Disease, 1978 CalM. L. REv.
612, 615; Hermann, supra note 100, at 355.
116. Field & Sullivan, supra note 107, at 54.
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that there has been an inappropriate focus upon criminal sanctions as a
means of addressing the current crisis because HIV has been associated
with traditionally unpopular groups and activities.117 AIDS-specific
criminal laws could become a tool of official persecution against gay men
and intravenous drug users, because they are the largest groups at risk
for AIDS. There is a risk that gay men could be harassed and punished
for their sexual orientation rather than for having committed any crime,
which could effectively criminalize gay male sex even in those jurisdic-
tions that no longer have sodomy laws.118 Such laws could be counter-
productive to preventing the spread of HIV, because they may
discourage people at risk from coming forward for testing and treatment.
Unfortunately, even though the potential for selective enforcement is
substantial," 9 it is extremely unlikely that a gay man or an intravenous
drug user could successfully assert a selective prosecution defense be-
cause of the difficulty in establishing such a claim.120
The dangers of selective enforcement may be avoided either by pub-
lic vigilance of police and prosecutorial activity12 1 or by adding provi-
sions to these laws limiting prosecutorial discretion."2 In addition, the
public must be made aware that criminal prosecution of people with HIV
will not diminish the danger of infection to those who engage in behavior
likely to transmit HIV.123
In sum, criminal laws proscribing conduct likely to transmit HIV
can realize the purposes underlying criminal law and can serve three so-
cial objectives: preventing the spread of the virus to uninfected people,
educating the public on the types of behavior that will put them at risk,
and reinforcing social norms against behavior that risks HIV transmis-
sion. However, the laws must be clearly drawn and narrowly tailored to
proscribe only the behavior that has epidemiologically been demon-
strated to transmit HIV. In addition, the public must be vigilant in
preventing the unnecessary invasion of privacy and the problems of selec-
tive prosecution in order to prevent discrimination against people with
HIV. If these precautions are followed, then the criminal law can be an
effective method of punishing those who engage in risky behavior, with-
117. Marvin E. Schechter, AIDS: How the Disease Is Being Criminalized, 3 CalM. JUST. J.
6, 7 (1988).
118. Field & Sullivan, supra note 107, at 55.
119. Gostin, supra note 104, at 1045.
120. Anne R. Spiegelman, Note, Selective Prosecution: A Viable Defense Against a Charge
of Transmitting AIDS?, 37 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L 337, 349 (1990).
121. Hermann, supra note 100, at 357.
122. Spiegelman, supra note 120, at 349-50.
123. Hermann, supra note 100, at 357-58.
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out becoming fuel for public hysteria and misinformation regarding HIV
and AIDS.
IV. CRIMINALIZING SEXUAL TRANSMISSION OF HIV
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Using Traditional Criminal Laws
Only sixteen states have enacted legislation making it a crime to
transmit HIV sexually.124 In the other states, the prosecution of infected
people who engage in behavior likely to transmit HIV can only occur
under traditional criminal statutes. This section discusses the crimes of
sodomy, murder, manslaughter, reckless endangerment, attempted mur-
der, and assault, and examines their application to HIV prosecutions.
The discussion outlines the evidentiary problems in prosecuting people
who are accused of engaging in conduct likely to result in HIV transmis-
sion, especially the difficulty in proving the elements of intent and
causation. 125
1. Sodomy
In most states, sodomy was originally defined as anal intercourse,
but has been expanded to also include oral-genital intercourse. 126 Since
the Model Penal Code recommended the decriminalization of sodomy in
1962, about half of the states have eliminated their prohibitions against
sodomy. 127 Most states that still retain sodomy laws do not limit the
reach of these laws either to same-sex or to extramarital relationships. 121
Despite the trend toward the decriminalization of sodomy, the
Supreme Court upheld Georgia's sodomy statute in Bowers v. Hard-
wick.' 29 The Court held that the statute did not violate fundamental
rights to privacy as the right applies to consensual adult homosexual sod-
omy in the home.13 0 Georgia argued that a state's police power includes
the power to make criminal those acts that may be hairmful to the general
public, including acts which spread communicable diseases.131 Georgia's
argument is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive as it applies to be-
124. See infra text accompanying notes 198-213.
125. Hermann, supra note 100, at 359.
126. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 465-66 (3d ed. 1982).
127. David Robinson, Jr., AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches and a New
Statutory Proposal, 14 HoFsTRA L. REv. 91, 97 (1985).
128. Hermann, supra note 100, at 360.
129. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
130. Id at 191.
131. Hermann, supra note 100, at 360.
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havior likely to transmit HIV.13 2 First, it is over-inclusive because not all
acts of sodomy transmit HIV. Only acts of sodomy without effective
barrier protection involving an HIV-infected partner and a non-infected
partner may transmit HIV. Public health authorities have advocated
that condom use during anal intercourse is an effective way to reduce the
likelihood of transmitting HW. 3 There is also evidence that HIV may
not be transmitted by oral sex. 134 Second, sodomy statutes are under-
inclusive to the extent that HIV may be transmitted during vaginal inter-
course.13  Vaginal intercourse is an activity that is not forbidden by any
sodomy statute.
In addition to the problems of over- and under-inclusiveness, sod-
omy laws carry problems of selective enforcement.136 For these reasons,
sodomy statutes are not particularly appropriate to punish or deter con-
duct likely to transmit HV.137
2. Murder
Murder is the most serious criminal offense with which a person can
be charged for transmitting HIV. 38 Under the Model Penal Code, the
state must prove that the accused had either a p'urposeful, knowing, or
reckless state of mind. 139 In order to establish a purposeful state of mind,
the state must establish that the accused was either aware or believed
that he or she was HIV-infected, that he or she believed that the virus
could be transmitted by the behavior engaged in, and that he or she de-
sired the death of the other person through this behavior."4 In order to
establish a knowing state of mind, the state must prove that the accused
132. Id.
133. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SURGEON GENERAL's REPORT ON
ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 17 (1987).
134. David Lyman et al., Minimal Risk of AIDS-Associated Retrovirus Infections by Oral-
Genital Contact, 255 JAMA 1703, 1703 (1986).
135. Handsfield, supra note 74, at 1943.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 116-23.
137. But see State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (Missouri Supreme Court found
the state's sodomy statute "rationally related to the State's concededly legitimate interest in
protecting the public health" by inhibiting the spread of HIV).
138. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (1985) (because of the wide variety in state laws,
the analysis of traditional criminal law will focus on the Model Penal Code).
139. Id.
140. Hermann, supra note 100, at 361-62. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2Xa) (1985):
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if
the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the
element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
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was aware that he or she carried HIV and that he or she was practically
certain that his or her actions would almost certainly transmit the vi-
rus.141 In order to show a reckless state of mind, the state must establish
that a person acted in conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that he or she was HIV-infected, could transmit HIV, and that
transmission could cause the death of another.142 Finally, a reckless
murder must be committed under conditions manifesting extreme indif-
ference to human life. 14 3
As with sodomy, using murder statutes to criminalize HIV-trans-
mitting conduct is problematic. First, most murder statutes require the
death of the victim. Because death may not occur for a considerable time
after transmission, often the accused will die before the victim. Under
such circumstances a charge of murder is moot.144
Second, the state must prove that the accused was both actually in-
fected and aware of his or her infection at the time that the HIV-trans-
mitting conduct occurred. Since many people are tested anonymously,
this will be difficult to prove in most cases. 1 45 In addition, testing the
accused after being charged is irrelevant because he or she could have
become HIV-positive after the incident in question. Testing also does not
address the situation in which the accused may have the virus but be
HIV antibody negative. 146
Third, proof of the requisite mental state is a substantial hurdle to
overcome in a murder prosecution for transmitting HIV. Under either
purposeful or knowing murder, the state must prove at least that the
accused knew that his or her conduct could transmit HIV, and that he or
she either intended to infect and consequently cause the death of another
141. Gostin, supra note 104, at 1043. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1985):
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if
the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is
aware that his conduct is of that or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the
element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that
his conduct will cause such a result.
142. Hermann, supra note 100, at 362. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985):
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circum-
stances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
143. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1985).
144. Burdt & Caldwell, supra note 102, at 689.
145. Hermann, supra note 100, at 362-63.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 47-60.
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or was practically certain that such infection and death would occur. 47
Since having sex is "a highly indirect modus operandi for the person
whose purpose is to kill,"' 48 this intent will probably be very difficult to
establish. In fact, one commentator tas suggested that, in the great ma-
jority of situations, the necessity of proving intent will make successful
prosecutions impossible. 49 Another commentator notes that anal or
vaginal intercourse engaged in by an accused who knows that he or she is
HIV-positive and that such behavior is risky ought not support a finding
of an intent to cause death 50 because the actor may hope or believe that
no injury will befall his or her partner, or may be indifferent to such a
fate.' Nevertheless, the prosecution should be able to establish the state
of mind of recklessness when the accused hopes there will be no injury or
is indifferent.1 52
Finally, even if the state is able to prove the requisite state of mind
for murder, establishing causation is probably the greatest obstacle in
proving charges for transmitting HIV. 53 In addition to proving that the
accused is in fact infected and that he or she engaged in conduct that
could have transmitted HIV, the state must also prove that the victim
acquired the infection because of the acts of the accused." Because of
the delay period between seroconversion and the onset of symptoms, de-
finitive proof that the victim was not already HIV-positive before the
alleged transmitting act will be necessary. 55 If the victim did not possess
negative test results that precede the alleged transmission, this may be
difficult. If the defense is able to show that the victim engaged in any
high risk contact with others prior to or after the accused's alleged trans-
mission (but before the onset of symptoms), it would be difficult for a
factfinder to decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the HIV came from
the accused.156
147. Hermann, supra note 100, at 363.
148. Field & Sullivan, supra note 107, at 47 (emphasis in original). In fact, researchers
have calculated that the likelihood of a female seroconverting as a result of a single act of
unprotected heterosexual intercourse with an infected male is about one in five hundred.
Hearst & Hulley, supra note 89, at 2429.
149. Robinson, supra note 127, at 97.
150. Gina Schultz, AIDS: Public Health and the Criminal Law, 7 ST. Louis U. Pun. L.
REv. 65, 85 (1988).
151. Id at 90.
152. Thomas Fitting, Note Criminal Liability for Transmission of AIDS: Some Eviden-
tary Problems, 10 C iM. JUST. J. 69, 96-97 (1987).
153. Id at 75.
154. Id
155. Id at 76.
156. Id at 76-77.
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In sum, due largely to the problems of proving intent and causation,
murder prosecutions for engaging in HIV-transmitting behavior are
likely to be ineffective and inappropriate.
3. Manslaughter
Under the Model Penal Code, a conviction of manslaughter requires
the state to show that the accused consciously disregarded a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that he or she was HIV-infected, that he or she
could transmit the virus, and that the conduct engaged in could do so.157
A risk is substantial and unjustifiable when it is of "a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor's situation." ' 8 It follows that if a jury found that the risk of
HIV infection was due to behavior which grossly deviated from the con-
duct of a law-abiding person, the state could prove a case of manslaugh-
ter even without proving that the accused knew that he or she was
infected with HIV at the time of the alleged conduct.15 9 One commenta-
tor has argued that any urban homosexual who engages in HIV-transmit-
ting conduct without precaution falls outside this standard."t * Another
commentator asserts that the risk of transmission of HIV through anal or
vaginal intercourse by an accused who knew he or she was HIV-positive
should generally be viewed as "substantial.""16
The difficulties in proving causation in a murder case are equally
applicable to manslaughter prosecutions. There is also an additional
problem with manslaughter prosecutions. Guilt in such cases turns on
how the jury evaluates the ways in which people should act. Conse-
quently, there is a possibility that irrational fear and personal prejudice
will taint the jury's consideration of the legal standards. 162 This is espe-
cially true if the accused is a member of a minority or unpopular group
whose lifestyle itself is seen as sinful and involving a gross deviation from
normal behavior.1 63 Misunderstanding by juries is counterproductive in
trying to control and educate people about AIDS and should not be the
157. Hermann, supra note 100, at 364. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(c), 210.3
(1985).
158. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
159. Hermann, supra note 100, at 364.
160. Burdt & Caldwell, supra note 102, at 691.
161. Schultz, supra note 150, at 90.
162. Id. at 92.
163. Hermann, supra note 100, at 365.
[Vol. 15
Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of HIV
basis for criminal prosecution or conviction. ' " Therefore, manslaughter
is also an inappropriate basis for prosecution of HIV-transmitting crimes.
4. Reckless Endangerment 165
Assuming that HIV infection constitutes a serious bodily injury,
reckless endangerment is another traditional crime that a seropositive ac-
cused might face. 16 6 In establishing reckless endangerment, the state
must prove only that the accused, with conscious disregard of a risk to
another, engaged in conduct which either placed or may have placed an-
other person in danger of serious bodily injury. 167 The factors for deter-
mining recklessness are similar to the manslaughter factors. However, a
showing that the victim was actually harmed is not necessary. 168
In addition, proof of the accused's infection may not even be neces-
sary under a reckless endangerment prosecution. 169 For example, as-
sume that a sexually active homosexual male experiences swollen lymph
nodes, which he knows to be symptoms of HIV infection as well as sev-
eral other common medical problems. If he takes no steps to determine
his serostatus and nevertheless engages in unprotected anal intercourse
(an activity which he knows risks transmission), then it may be argued
that he consciously disregarded a risk to another by engaging in conduct
which may have placed another person in danger of serious bodily injury.
Since the risk disregarded must be evaluated in light of the circumstances
known to him, such a scenario is at least plausible.17
If actual infection is not a condition for reckless endangerment, the
scope of reckless endangerment prosecutions could be enormous."
There are potentially millions of people who are members of high risk
groups who could face criminal charges.172 Use of the crime of reckless
endangerment against people who engage in HIV-transmitting conduct
also carries several dangers. First, as with manslaughter, there is an in-
164. Schultz, supra note 150, at 92.
165. The Model Penal Code also provides for a negligent state of mind to be the basis of
criminal culpability. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (1985). Since the author believes that
negligence should be confined to tort law and not criminal law, however, negligent crimes will
not be discussed in this Note.
166. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1985): "A person commits a misdemeanor if he
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or
serious bodily injury."
167. Hermann, supra note 100, at 369.
168. Schechter, supra note 117, at 8.
169. Schultz, supra note 150, at 103.
170. Id
171. Gostin, supra note 104, at 1052.
172. Id
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herent danger that juries may be prejudiced by the status of the accused.
Evidence that a person is a member of a high risk group, however, should
not suffice because conduct and not status creates a. risk of infection. 173
Second, the state could attempt to admit highly prejudicial evidence of
the accused's sexual history in order to establish that the risk of transmit-
ting HIV had been disregarded. Third, an approach based on reckless-
ness could target more people than those who engage in truly
blameworthy behavior, 174 thereby frustrating efforts to educate the pub-
lic about the means by which HIV is transmitted. Finally, the crime is
considered a misdemeanor, which may reduce its efficacy as a device to
punish or deter this type of behavior, which is one of the justifications for
resorting to the criminal law in the first place. 175
5. Attempted Murder
In order to prove attempted murder under the Model Penal Code,
the state must prove that the accused acted with the purpose of causing
death or a belief that death would result. 176 The advantage of using the
charge of attempted murder to deter HIV-transmitting conduct is that
the state does not have to prove causation, the death of the victim, or
actual transmission of HIV. 177 However, attempted murder requires
proving the most demanding state of mind: purposeful or knowing
intent. 178
Some unique defenses exist to a charge of attempted murder. First,
some states require that the accused's expectation of causing death not be
unreasonable. 179 In these states, if an accused's belief that a particular
activity would cause the death of another is unreasonable (i.e., by spitting
at another person), then he or she has a defense to a charge of attempted
murder. Other states have retained the defense of legal impossibility,
which would provide a defense to an accused whose behavior has been
medically proven to be incapable of transmitting HIV.180 In such states,
any activity other than anal or vaginal intercourse (and the sharing of
173. Schultz, supra note 150, at 104.
174. Gostin, supra note 104, at 1052.
175. Hermann, supra note 100, at 369.
176. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (1985).
177. Hermann, supra note 100, at 365.
178. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (1985): "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he
... [acts] with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause [a particular] result
... ." (in this case the death of the victim).
179. See, eg., State v. Mitchell, 116 N.W. 808 (Iowa 1908).
180. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-3-101 (Michie 1987) (affirmative defense that conduct
inherently unlikely to result in crimes).
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needles) could fall under this defense. Indeed, because of the remote pos-
sibility of transmission from one act of vaginal intercourse, this defense
may even be appropriate in such a case.
The Model Penal Code has eliminated the defense of impossibility
for all crimes, including attempted murder, but has added sections to
prevent the unjust application of the criminal law. Section 5.05(1) of the
Code makes attempt a crime of "the same grade and degree as the most
serious offense that is attempted," except that an attempt to commit a
capital crime or a felony of the first degree is a felony of the second de-
gree.' Where the conduct charged as constituting the attempt is "so
inherently unlikely to result or culminate in the commission of a crime
that neither such conduct nor the actor presents a public danger warrant-
ing the grading of such offense under [section 5.04]," section 5.05(2) au-
thorizes the Court to reduce the grade of the offence or dismiss the
prosecution.1 12 The Code also directs the court to dismiss prosecutions
when it finds that the accused's conduct either did not threaten the harm
"sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to
an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction."18 3 Be-
cause of public misunderstanding concerning the risks of transmission
and prejudice against members of high risk groups, however, there is the
danger that a jury may be too willing to find that particular behavior
could kill."' As a result, courts ought to dismiss prosecutions where the
evidence reveals no substantial danger of transmitting the virus."8 5
Attempted murder is not an appropriate basis for deterring HIV-
transmitting behavior because the state is required to prove the most de-
manding state of mind, which is possible only in rare cases. The person
with HIV who has sexual intercourse with another person with a con-




Under the Model Penal Code, a person can be guilty of assault if he
or she "attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another...."I87 Such assaults are a misdemeanor. The
181. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1985).
182. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2) (1985).
183. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12(2) (1985).
184. Schultz, supra note 150, at 100.
185. Id at 105.
186. Field & Sullivan, supra note 107, at 49.
187. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(a) (1985).
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Code provides for a felony penalty for aggravated assault if the accused
"attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury
purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting ex-
treme indifference to the value of human life . . .,.s" In the context of
HIV, an accused may be guilty of aggravated assault if, while aware that
he or she is infected with HIV and is capable of infecting others, he or
she engages in behavior likely to transmit HIV while knowing that such
behavior is likely to facilitate transmission of HIV.1 9
The state faces the same problems of proof as in most of the other
crimes previously discussed. It must prove that the accused was aware of
his or her HIV status, believed that his or her conduct could transmit
HIV, and that it is in fact possible to transmit HIV by the conduct in
which the accused engaged.
The Model Penal Code provides that consent is a defense to assault.
However, this defense is only available when the conduct and the injury
are "reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in ...con-
certed activity not forbidden by law .... ,,1 Therefore, in the context of
HIV, simple consent to sexual intercourse is not enough. Only informed
consent will suffice.191 Therefore, disclosure by an infected person to a
potential sex partner of his or her serostatus and of the danger of trans-
mission through sexual contact would be necessary to make such trans-
mission "reasonably foreseeable."' 192 Allowing a defense of consent
would encourage disclosure and reward responsible behavior, while de-
nying this defense would leave a person with HIV the choice of either
sexual abstinence or potential criminal liability.1 93 However, assault
prosecutions are not the best way to punish HIV-transmitting behavior
because, in addition to problems of proving intent and causation, they do
not specifically describe the behavior to be avoided or educate the public
about the activities likely to spread HIV.
In conclusion, because of problems of proving the requisite intent,
establishing causation, the danger of overbroad application, and their in-
ability to educate the public about behavior that risks transmitting HIV,
traditional crimes such as sodomy, murder, manslaughter, reckless en-
dangerment, attempted murder, and assault are neither appropriate nor
188. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(a) (1985).
189. Hermann, supra note 100, at 367.
190. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2)(b) (1985) (Presently, this section has only been used
in the context of sports activities. However, it foreseeably could apply to situations involving
HIV.).
191. Field & Sullivan, supra note 107, at 49.
192. Schultz, supra note 150, at 106.
193. Id. at 107.
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effective as a means for prosecuting HIV-infected persons who engage in
behavior likely to transmit HIV.1  Therefore, several states have begun
to enact new HIV specific criminal statutes that seek to avoid the
problems inherent in traditional crimes.
B. HIV-Specifie Statutes
The Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Vi-
rus Epidemic, in its final report in 1988, recommended that states adopt
criminal statutes specific to HIV infection. 19" Its reasoning was based on
the problems in applying traditional criminal law to HIV transmis-
sion.196 According to the Commission, an HIV-specific statute should
provide "clear notice of socially unacceptable standards of behavior spe-
cific to the HIV epidemic, and tailor punishment to the specific crime of
HIV transmission." 197
In the last several years, twelve states have passed statutes making it
a crime for an HIV-infected person knowingly to engage in behavior
likely to transmit HIV.198 Six states have enacted statutes that criminal-
ize HIV transmission behavior only in the context of prostitution. 19
Two states have criminalized conduct likely to transmit HIV both gener-
194. Hermann, supra note 100, at 369.
195. REPORT, supra note 101, at 130.
196. Id.
197. Id
198. These statutes are: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-608 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,% 12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 43.5 (West Supp. 1992); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-601.1 (Supp.
1990); MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.5210 (West Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677
(Vernon Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-112 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17
(Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West Supp. 1992); Tx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.012 (West Supp. 1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.021 (West Supp. 1990).
199. See, e-g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647f (West Supp. 1992) (felony to engage in prostitu-
tion or solicit prostitute after previous conviction, but only upon being tested for HIV and
informed of positive test results after previous conviction); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-7-201.7,
18-7-205.7 (Supp. 1990) (felony either to commit prostitution or patronize prostitute after pre-
vious conviction of same crime and tests positive as result of such previous conviction); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 796.08(5), (6) (West Supp. 1992) (misdemeanor to either commit prostitution or
procure another to commit prostitution "in a manner likely to transmit HI" after positive
HIV test and knowledge of transmitting activities); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 529.090 (Baldwin
Supp. 1990) (felony to either commit prostitution or procure another to commit prostitution
"in a manner likely to transmit HIV" after positive HIV test and knowledge of transmitting
activities, and misdemeanor to commit prostitution after testing positive but without engaging
in activity likely to transmit HIV); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.358 (Michie Supp. 1989)
(felony to either engage in prostitution or to work in licensed house of prostitution after receiv-
ing notice of positive HIV test); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-516 (Supp. 1991) (felony to engage
in sexual activity as a business or to loiter in a public place for the purpose of being hired to
engage in sexual activity after knowledge of HIV infection).
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ally and in the context of prostitution.200 Finally, two states have pro-
vided for the enhancement of sentences for crimes which involve conduct
likely to transmit HIV.20 1
Of the states which have made it a crime for an HIV-infected person
to engage in behavior likely to transmit HIV, all but two have made the
offense punishable as a felony.20 2 This is intended to deflect criticism
that the criminal law is too lenient when the transmitting behavior is
engaged in knowingly or intentionally.20 a Most states do not require spe-
cific intent, thereby eliminating the difficult problems of proof arising in
traditional criminal offenses. 2° These states only require proof that the
behavior took place. Only one state, Missouri, requires proof that the
accused knew that the conduct in question created a risk of transmitting
HIV.
205
In theory, the advantage of HIV-specific laws is that they are nar-
rowly drafted to address specific conduct that is likely to transmit HIV.
The laws that have been passed, however, are neither narrowly drafted
nor do they prohibit specific conduct. Several of the statutes are drafted
so that they clearly proscribe conduct that poses no risk of transmitting
HIV.206 Others are written so broadly that they either do not require
proof that the unlawful conduct poses a medically recognized risk of
HIV transmission, or are so vague that it is not clear what conduct is
200. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c) (Harrison Supp. 1991) (prostitution: felony to so-
licit or to perform sexual intercourse or sodomy without disclosing HIV infection); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-29-145 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (prostitution: felony to commit act of prostitu-
tion after knowledge of positive HIV test results).
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.85 (West Supp. 1992) (provides for three-year enhance-
ment of sentence for sex offense after knowledge of seropositive status); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
38-1-7.1 (West Supp. 1991) (aggravating circumstance or factor in imposing consecutive terms
if HIV-positive sex offender's conduct created epidemiologically demonstrated risk of
transmission).
202. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-601.1 (1990) (punishable as misdemeanor,
but provides for sentence up to 3 years); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-112 to -113 (1989)
(misdemeanor).
203. Hermann, supra note 100, at 371.
204. Those statutes requiring specific intent for conviction: LA, REv. STAT. ANN, § 43.5
(West Supp. 1992); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-601.1 (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1192.1 (West Supp. 1992); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012 (West Supp. 1992); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.021 (West Supp. 1990).
205. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
206. See, eg., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(c) (Michie Supp. 1991); MicH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.5210(2) (West Supp. 1991) (prohibits "sexual penetration" that involves "any in-
trusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal
openings of another person's body"). See also IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1991) (prohibits
the transfer of saliva); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012 (West Supp. 1992) (prohibits transfer
of bodily fluids through the other person's skin, among other things).
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being proscribed.2 7 Therefore, these laws, on the whole, do not fulfill
the social objectives of the criminal law.
The vagueness of the Illinois statute is typical.208 The statute pro-
hibits "intimate contact with another" in a manner that could result in
transmission. This is defined as the exposure of the body of one person to
the bodily fluid of another. This definition proscribes such safe-sex activ-
ities as mutual masturbation, where the semen of one person comes into
contact with the skin of another person. In addition, the meaning of
"intimate contact" is broader than mere sexual contact. Two commenta-
tors have concluded that the Illinois statute encourages abortion by
criminalizing childbirth for HIV-infected mothers.2°9
No state, with the possible exception of Missouri, allows as a defense
evidence that the accused was never given any counseling on the behav-
ior that risks transmission of HIV or that the accused did not know that
the behavior engaged in was a high risk one. Without such a counseling
defense, people could be punished for activities that they did not know to
be risky. Additional defenses are provided in other states: prior disclo-
sure of serostatus,21 0 the informed consent of the "victim, 21 1 and evi-
dence that a licensed physician advised the accused that he or she was
noninfectious. 2 2
These HIV-specific statutes, for the most part, have eliminated the
207. See IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1991) (prohibits transfer or attempt to transfer any
body fluid, including saliva or urine); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1990) (prohibits the exposure of body of one person to bodily fluid of another in manner that
could result in HIV transmission) (emphasis added); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43.5 (West Supp.
1992) (prohibits exposure through sexual contact, without defining it); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 18-601.1 (1990) (prohibits the transfer or attempt to transfer HIV to another,
again without definition); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-112 (1989) (prohibition on knowingly
exposing another to infection, without definitions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West
Supp. 1992) (unlawful to engage in any activity with intent to transmit); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.012 (West Supp. 1992) (unlawful to engage in conduct reasonably likely to result in
the transfer of bodily fluids); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.021 (West Supp. 1990) (unlaw-
ful to administer or cause HIV to be taken by another person).
208. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
209. See Michael L. Closen & Scott H. Isaacman, Are AIDS-Transmission Laws Encourag-
ing Abortion?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1990, at 76; Scott H. Isaacman, Are We Outlawing Motherhood
for HIV-Infected Women?, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.. 479 (1991).
210. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60
(Harrison Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, r 12-
16.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43.5 (West Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 333.5210 (West Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (1991) (only if
along with use of appropriate prophylactic device); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1990); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012 (West Supp. 1992).
211. See supra note 210.
212. IDAHO CODE § 39-608(3)(b) (Supp. 1991).
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problem of proving the accused's intent by abolishing any requirement of
purposeful or knowing intent to transmit HIV. The causation problem is
avoided because none of the statutes require proof that the victim was
infected by the accused. However, these statutes have fallen short of the
objective of educating the public about the means of transmitting HIV.
Many are also overbroad in that they proscribe behavior that does not
transmit HIV. In addition, some of the statutes may be challenged as
unconstitutionally vague because they fail to adequately define prohibited
conduct, and thereby do not give fair notice.213 In sum, although these
statutes are an improvement in this area over the traditional criminal
law, they are far from perfect.
V. INTERNATIONAL STATUTES
This Note now analyzes some international criminal statutes and
compares them to American statutes. The analysis is then synthesized
and the Note suggests the creation of an HIV-specific statute that com-
bines the best of the statutes from around the world.
A. Great Britain
For over one hundred years, British statutory and common law has
imposed criminal sanctions upon those individuals who knowingly trans-
mit a contagious disease.214 For the crimes of murder and manslaughter,
the British still follow the rule that the victim must die within a year and
a day of the unlawful act for such a prosecution to proceed.215 Since
people with HIV often do not even exhibit symptoms in the first year
after they seroconvert, much less die, a prosecution for murder or man-
slaughter is extremely rare. If a murder prosecution does occur, the Brit-
ish requirement for the accused's mens rea is similar to that of the Model
Penal Code.216
In addition to murder with purposeful or knowing intent, British
law also proscribes a form of "insensitive" recklessness, which involves
213. Hendricks, supra note 105, at 13-25. Other constitutional challenges could include
violations of equal protection (by singling out for prosecution gay men or intravenous drug
users).
214. See Regina v. Sinclair, 13 Cox's Crim. Cases 28 (Eng. 1867).
215. Gerard Forlin & Piers Wauchope, AIDS and the Criminal Law, 84 LAw SOCIETY'S
GAZETrE 884, 884 (1987); see also R.N. Howie & P.J. Webb, The Legal Response to AIDS, 18
AusT. J. FORENSIC SCIENCES 44, 47 (1985). However, this requirement is not a part of Scot-
tish law. See Graeme T. Laurie, AIDS and Criminal Liability Under Scots Law, 36 J. LAW
Soc. SCOTLAND 312, 314 (1991).
216. See J6rold Taitz, Legal Liability for Transmitting AIDS, 57 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 216,
218 (1989).
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"a conscious taking of the risk of resultant death."2 17 An accused may
be guilty of murder (or attempted murder) if the accused knows of his or
her positive serostatus and how HIV is transmitted, has sexual inter-
course with another person either with the intent to infect them or with
indifference to whether the partner contracts IV, and if that person
does become HIV infected and dies within a year and a day. If the victim
does not die within a year and a day, the accused may be charged with
attempted murder.218
Manslaughter in Britain is described as the unlawful killing of a per-
son where there is no specific subjective or legal intention to kill.219 In
the context of HIV, one commentator has suggested that a person (a
male homosexual prostitute, in his example) may be guilty of manslaugh-
ter if he or she is a member of a high risk group, knows about IV and
how it is transmitted, is HIV-positive but does not know it, and, without
doing anything to ascertain his or her serostatus, engages in high risk
sexual behavior.' 0 If one of his or her partners dies within a year and a
day of the contact with the accused and causation can be established,
then the accused may be held culpable.
Assault is also a potential basis of liability for MiV-transmitting be-
havior under British law. In the 1867 case of Regina v. Sinclair,221 the
court sentenced the defendant to a year in prison for transmitting gonor-
rhea to a thirteen-year-old girl. The court reasoned that even if the girl
could have consented to sexual intercourse, her consent was ineffective
because she was not aware of the defendant's condition.m The court,
relying on Regina v. Bennett,223 invoked the proposition that "fraud viti-
ates consent." The English Court of Appeal, however, seriously ques-
tioned Bennett and Sinclair twenty years later in the case of The Queen v.
Clarence, in which a husband transmitted gonorrhea to his wife through
sexual intercourse, without informing her of his condition. 4 The hus-
band was charged with unlawfully and maliciously inflicting grievous
bodily harm on his wife, and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, in
violation of sections 20 and 47, respectively, of the Offenses Against the
217. Id
218. Id
219. J.C. SMrrH & BRIAN HoGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 302 (5th ed. 1983).
220. Taitz, supra note 216, at 219. However, this reinforces the mistaken belief that high
risk groups alone are responsible for the spread of HIV. See Laurie, supra note 215, at 316.
221. 13 Cox's Crim. Cases 28 (Eng. 1867).
222. Id at 29.
223. 176 Eng. Rep. 925 (W. Cir. Ct. 1866).
224. 22 Q.B.D. 23 (1888).
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Person Act (OAPA) of 1861.225 The court in Clarence quashed the con-
viction. A plurality of the court in Clarence stated that "the proposition
that fraud vitiates consent in criminal matters is not true if taken to apply
in the fullest sense of the word, and without qualification. ' 22 6 Among
the rationales for this decision was the judges' belief that a marital rela-
tionship itself implied in law the wife's consent to all marital relations,227
and that sections 20 and 47 of the OAPA were not intended to encom-
pass behavior such as this.228 Despite its age and seemingly unjustifiable
result, commentators believe that Clarence would be followed today in
the context of AIDS.229 Therefore, prosecutions against spouses for in-
flicting grievous bodily harm and assault causing actual bodily harm
under sections 20 and 47 of OAPA will probably be unsuccessful unless
Clarence is overruled by a court of appeal. Clarence, however, may not
be considered by courts to be as persuasive in situations where the al-
leged victim is not married to the accused.230
Section 23 of the OAPA is the British law under which a criminal
prosecution 231 for transmitting HIV would most likely be successful.
Although no case has been brought under this section, it is the most
appropriate section.232 Section 23 prohibits maliciously administering to
another person any poison or other destructive or noxious thing so as
thereby to endanger the other person's life or to inflict upon him or her
grievous bodily harm.233 In Clarence, the plurality opinion stated that
225. Id Offenses Against the Person Act, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, §§ 20, 47 (1861) (Eng.).
226. 22 Q.B.D. at 43 (opinion of Stephen, J., joined by Mathew, Smith, Grantham and
Huddleston, J.J., and Coleridge, C.J.). However, in Scotland consent is only a defense if given
with full knowledge of all material facts. See Laurie, supra note 215, at 314.
227. 22 Q.B.D. at 37 (opinion of Smith, J.), 64 (opinion of Pollock, J.).
228. 22 Q.B.D. at 36 (opinion of Wills, J.), 41, 46 (opinion of Stephen, J.).
229. See Lynch, supra note 115, at 619; Forlin & Wauchope, supra note 215, at 884; Diana
Brahams, AIDS and the Law, 55 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 191, 196 (1987).
230. Sullivan, supra note 113, at 494.
231. Public Health Act (Control of Disease Act), 1984, § 37 provides that a person can be
indefinitely confined to a hospital if a judge is satisfied, after an ex parte hearing, that the
person is not taking proper precautions to prevent the spread of infection and causes a serious
risk of infection to other persons. Although this is not a criminal statute but a public health
one, it is difficult to imagine a more intrusive regulatory scheme. The criminal law, no matter
how unfair, always allows the accused an opportunity to be heard. For commentary on this
and other sections of the Public Health Act, see Ronald Elsberry, Note, AIDS Quarantine in
England and the United States, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 113, 126-27 (1986);
Marlene C. McGuirl & Robert N. Gee, AIDS. An Overview of the British, Australian, and
American Responses, 14 HoFSTRA L. REv. 107, 110-13 (1985); Brahams, supra note 229, at
192; and R.G.S. Aitken, AIDS: Some Myths and Realities, 84 LAW SOcIETY's GAZETTr 239
(1987).
232. Alistair Orr, AIDS: Adapting the Law, 138 NEw L.J. 388, 391 (1988).
233. Offenses Against the Person Act, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, § 23 (1861) (Eng.),
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"[i]nfection is a kind of poisoning... ."I' If they are correct, then the
statute should apply to HIV transmission. Consent is a defense to prose-
cutions under section 23.2a s
Section 23 would perhaps be more effective if used in conjunction
with the Criminal Attempts Act of 1981.36 Combining these two would
allow prosecution without actual proof of transmission to the victim.237
The prosecution would then only have to prove that the accused was
HIV-positive at the time of the conduct in question, although this may be
difficult. 8 The victim, if he or she had seroconverted, would not need to
establish that it was the accused who transmitted HIV to him or her.239
In Scotland, a prosecution for engaging in HIV-transmitting con-
duct may also be brought under the law of "real injury," which makes
intentional infliction of physical injury a criminal offense. a4° Prosecu-
tions under this law would be based on the 1983 case Khaliq v. H.M.
Advocate,241 where the High Court of Justiciary refused the appeal of two
shopkeepers who had been charged with "real injury" after they sold
glue-sniffing kits to children.242
In Khaliq, the court found a "real injury" simply in the inhalation of
glue and did not require the government to prove that any of the children
were actually injured by the glue-sniffing kits supplied by defendants. 243
Therefore, prosecutors may no longer have to prove that any harm actu-
ally resulted from the accused's actions.24 This case also reduces the
prosecutor's burden of proving causation. In convicting the shopkeepers
of causing injury to the children, the court found that the voluntrary
inhalation of the fumes from the glue by the children did not relieve the
shopkeepers of liability.245
In the context of HIV, then, prosecutions could be brought for "real
injury" without the necessity of showing that actual transmission oc-
curred and regardless of the blameworthiness of the "victim." '246 Since
234. The Queen v. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. 23, 42 (1888) (opinion of Stephen, J., joined by
Mathew, Smith, Grantham and Huddleston, J.J., and Coleridge, CJ.).
235. Forlin & Wauchope, supra note 215, at 884.
236. Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, §§ 1-4, 6 (Eng.).
237. Forlin & Wauchope, supra note 215, at 885.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
239. Forlin & Wauchope, supra note 215, at 885.
240. Orr, supra note 232, at 391.
241. 1984 J.C. 23 (Scot).
242. 1984 J.C. at 24, 36.
243. 1984 J.C. at 35-36.
244. Laurie, supra note 215, at 315.
245. Lindsay Farmer et al., Scots Criminal Law and AIDS, 1987 Scos L TIMES 387, 391.
246. Laurie, supra note 215, at 315.
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prosecutions for "real injury" are not limited to risky behavior, however,
they fail to provide clear notice of the conduct proscribed and do not
educate the public about risky behavior. One commentator also con-
tends that "real injury" prosecutions put the accused at the mercy of the
moral indignation of the trier of fact.247
Unfortunately, the British criminal law as it relates to HIV suffers
from the same problems as its American counterpart. There are no stat-
utes that clearly describe the behavior that is unlawful and all are suscep-
tible to the prejudices of the prosecutor and the trier of fact. Problems of
proving intent and causation are also present. As a result, British law
does not furnish a model for future HIV-related criminal law in the
United States.
B. Australia
Australian common law offenses are much like those of Great Brit-
ain, and therefore the same drawbacks apply to their use in punishing
behavior likely to lead to HIV transmission. Four provinces have passed
legislation that specifically criminalizes the transmission of HIV from
one person to another.24 8 Unfortunately, the governments of Queensland
and New South Wales enacted their legislation in response to public de-
mands for government action to stop the spread of AIDS in the early
days of the epidemic. As such, the laws have been condemned by schol-
ars as ill-considered actions.249
Queensland passed the Health Act Amendment Act (No. 2) in 1984.
This law imposes a penalty of $10,000 (Austl.), two years imprisonment,
or both on any person who knowingly infected any other person with
HIV.250 This law imposes strict liability for specific conduct.251  The
only defense allowed is if, at the time of transmission, the accused was
either the spouse or the "connubial" of the "victim," who knew of the
accused's serostatus, and voluntarily ran the risk of being infected.25 2
247. Id. (quoting GERALD H. GORDON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 2-5 (2d ed.
1978)).
248. These statutes are: Queensl. Health Act Amendment Act (No. 3), 1988, § 48 (Austl.);
N.S.W. Public Health (Proclaimed Diseases) Amendment Act, 1985, § 3 (Austl.); S. Austl.
Pub. & Envt'l Health Act, 1987, § 37(1) (Austl.); and Vict. Health (General Amendment) Act,
1988, § 120(1) (Austl.).
249. See Gaye T. Lansdell, What Have We Achieved? Reviewing AIDS-Related Law and
Policy in Australia, 18 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 201, 212 (1989).
250. Queensl. Health Act Amendment Act (No. 2), No. 103, 1984 Queensl. Stat. 1195,
§ 3(0, (g) (1984) (Austl.).
251. McGuirl & Gee, supra note 231, at 116.
252. Queensl. Health Act Amendment Act (No. 2), No. 103, 1984 Queensl. Stat. 1195,
§ 3(h), (i) (1984) (Austl.).
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This statute did not specifically regulate a particular mode of
transmission.253
In 1988, the Queensland Health Act Amendment was repealed and
replaced with another Health Act Amendment Act.' The new Act is
almost identical to the 1984 Act, except that it adds two provisions to
ensure privacy: criminal proceedings under the law are to be held in
camera, and "no report shall be made or published concerning the pro-
ceedings unless authorized by the court or contained in a law report."2"
Commentators have criticized the criminal provision in New South
Wales even more extensively than the Queensland Act." 6 The New
South Wales statute makes it a crime for a person with AIDS to have
sexual intercourse with another person. 57 The accused's only defense is
if the other person was informed of the risk of contracting AIDS before
intercourse and voluntarily agreed to accept that risk.258 The penalty for
violation is $5,000 (Austl.).219  There is no provision for
imprisonment.2 °
The New South Wales statute does not define "sexual inter-
course,"26' thereby failing to provide clear guidelines as to the proscribed
behavior. It is also both overbroad and underinclusive. It is overbroad
because it arguably proscribes activities that have not been shown to
transmit liV.262 It is underinclusive since it does not prohibit non-sex-
ual high risk behavior, like sharing needles. For these reasons, commen-
tators believe the statute was aimed solely at homosexual activity.26 3
South Australia and Victoria have also passed legislation criminaliz-
ing the transmission of HIV. South Australia's law requires that persons
suffering from AIDS or ARC take all reasonable measures to prevent
transmission of the disease to others".2  The penalty for violating the law
is a fine of $10,000 (Austl.).265 The law does not define the term "reason-
able measures" and does not mention whether it is possible for the un-
253. Lansdell, supra note 249, at 212.
254. See Queensl. Health Act Amendment Act (No. 3), 1988, § 48 (Austl.).
255. Id
256. See Lansdell, supra note 249, at 213.
257. N.S.W. Public Health (Proclaimed Diseases) Amendment Act, 1985, § 3 (Austl.) (in-
serting § 50N(3) into the N.S.W. Public Health Act of 1902).
258. Id
259. Id
260. McGuirl & Gee, supra note 231, at 120.
261. Lansdell, supra note 249, at 213.
262. Oral-genital intercourse, or vaginal or anal intercourse with a condom, for example.
263. Lansdell, supra note 249, at 213.
264. S. Austl. Pub. & Envt'L. Health Act, 1987, § 37(1) (Austl.).
265. I
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knowing transmission of HIV to be penalized.266
In Victoria, in 1988, the state made it an offense to knowingly or
recklessly infect another person with an infectious disease, including
HIV.267 The penalty for a violation is $20,000 (Austl.).268 The only de-
fense is when the "victim" knew and voluntarily accepted the risk of
being infected.269
There are many problems with Victoria's and South Australia's stat-
utes. First, they do not clearly define the prohibited conduct and are not
narrowly tailored to that conduct. Therefore, the accused is not given
notice as to what conduct is acceptable and what is unlawful. In addi-
tion, these statutes do not educate the public about which activities are
high risk and which are safe. Finally, the statutes of all four provinces
are vague, thereby creating a danger that prejudice will color both the
decision to prosecute and the one to convict. Nevertheless, the portion of
the 1988 Queensland statute that ensures the privacy of the accused and
"victim" should serve as a model for laws discouraging HIV-transmitting
conduct.
C. New Zealand
New Zealand has passed several different laws that may be applied
to behavior which is conducive to the sexual transmission of HIV. First,
section 92 of the Health Act of 1956 prohibits a person from either
knowingly infecting or knowingly doing or permitting any act likely to
infect another person with a venereal disease.270 Under the knowingly
infecting prong, an infection must result and the state must prove that
the accused intended to transmit the infection.27 Under the knowingly
doing or permitting prong, it is possible that an accused could be con-
victed without knowing that he or she is a disease carrier or that trans-
mission could occur as a result of the conduct.272 The Act provides for a
fine of £100 (N.Z.) or imprisonment for as long as one year upon convic-
tion.273 To date, this law has not been applied to HIV.
Second, the legislature enacted several provisions of the Crimes Bill
of 1989, amending the Crimes Act of 1961, in response to the need for
266. Lansdell, supra note 249, at 214.
267. Vict. Health (General Amend.) Act, 1988, § 120(1) (Austl.).
268. Id.
269. Id § 120(2).
270. N.Z. Health Act, 1956, § 92 (N.Z.).
271. C.E.F. Rickett, AIDS, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and the Criminal Law, 20 ViCT.
U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 183, 196 (1990).
272. Id.
273. N.Z. Health Act, 1956, § 92 (N.Z.).
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specific legislation providing for criminal liability for transmitting
HIV.274 The 1989 provisions do not specifically mention HIV, but were
clearly intended to encompass HIV.
Analysis of the Crimes Act of 1961 illuminates what the 1989 Bill is
amending. For murder and manslaughter prosecutions, the Crimes Act
of 1961 contains the common law requirement that death must occur
within a year and a day of the act.275 Because of the death and intent
requirements, the likelihood of success of a homicide prosecution for
transmitting HIV is so low as to be not worth the attempt.276 Prosecu-
tion for attempted murder also requires proof of specific intent to commit
the offense of murder.277 The acts must have been committed for the
purpose of accomplishing the offense.27 Neither factual nor legal impos-
sibility is a defense,279 and the occurrence of actual transmission is irrele-
vant.2 0 As with murder, successful prosecutions of attempted murder
are unlikely.
Several assault statutes in the Crimes Act of 1961 also may be rele-
vant to punishing HIV-transmitting behavior.2"' Sections 188 and 189
prohibit causing grievous bodily harm with either the intent to do so or
with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Assuming HIV qualifies
as a grievous bodily harm, the intent requirement results in the same
barrier to successful prosecution as the requirement does with murder.
Recklessness has never been defined in any situation analogous to the
sexual transmission of HIV, but it would seem to include the situation in
which the accused knows of his or her infection and knows what types of
behavior are high risk, but engages in such behavior anyway.28 In addi-
tion, section 190 provides for liability for injury in circumstances where,
had death occurred, the accused would be guilty of manslaughter. The
requisite intent is, again, at least recklessness.28 3 Informed consent
would be a defense under such statutes.284
The Crimes Act of 1961 also makes it a crime to infect another per-
274. See Sir Ronald Cooke, The Crimes Bill 1989: A Judges Response, 1989 N.Z. W. 235,
236.
275. N.Z. Crimes Act, 1961, § 162 (N.Z.).
276. Rickett, supra note 271, at 202.
277. N.Z. Crimes Act, 1961, §§ 72, 173 (N.Z.).
278. Id § 72(1).
279. Id.
280. Id § 173.
281. Id. §§ 188, 189, 190.
282. See Rickett, supra note 271, at 204-05.
283. N.Z. Crimes Act, 1961, § 190 (N.Z.).
284. Rickett, supra note 271, at 206-07.
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son with a disease.2 85 Section 201 prohibits a person from willfully and
without lawful justification causing a disease or sickness in any other per-
son.286 The intent requirement is the same as in a murder prosecution,
and thus this law involves the same problems of proof.
The Crimes Bill of 1989 makes several substantive changes to the
Crimes Act of 1961, several of which are applicable to the context of the
sexual transmission of HIV. Section 122 on homicide was amended to
remove the requirement that the victim die within a year and a day. The
new mental intent requirement only mandates that the accused "mean"
to cause bodily injury, knowing it likely that the act will cause death or
serious bodily injury.28 7 Nonetheless, the victim must still die, and
problems in proving causation remain.288
The 1989 amendment to the assault provisions removes the require-
ment that the victim be'injured or infected.289 The new provision pro-
vides for a five year prison term for anyone who "heedlessly" commits
any act which is likely to cause injury or to endanger the health and
safety of another.2" Heedlessness occurs where there is a risk of the
consequence "obvious to any reasonable person" even if not obvious to
the accused, and under the circumstances it was unreasonable to take the
risk.2 91 This section has potentially unlimited reach. It gives the trier of
fact practically unlimited discretion to determine whether the risk of a
consequence that has already occurred is "obvious." The personal
prejudices of the trier will almost certainly color his or her judgement.
At least one commentator has concluded that New Zealand criminal
law, as applied to HIV, is deficient.292 The law leaves too much discre-
tion to prosecutors, thereby encouraging selective enforcement. In addi-
tion, the law is much too susceptible to being adversely affected by the
personal prejudices of the trier of fact. Therefore, the criminal law of
New Zealand cannot serve as a model for a statute criminalizing behav-
ior that is likely to transmit HIV.
VI. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW STATUTE
The problem for criminal laws that proscribe HIV-transmitting be-
285. N.Z. Crimes Act, 1961, § 201 (N.Z.).
286. Id
287. N.Z. Crimes Bill, 1989, § 122(1) (N.Z.).
288. See supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
289. N.Z. Crimes Bill, 1989, §§ 130, 132 (N.Z.).
290. Id. § 132(1)(b).
291. Id. §23.
292. Rickett, supra note 271, at 211.
[Vol. 15
Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of HIV
havior is not one of how they can best curb the disease's spread, but
rather how to best influence people to avoid behavior that is dangerous to
themselves and to others.2 93 Both traditional and HIV-specific criminal
statutes in force in many countries today are far from perfect. The tradi-
tional statutes are problematic because they were not designed to encom-
pass conduct involving the sexual transmission of EIIV. HIV-specific
statutes have been passed most often as political measures to calm the
fears of the populace at the beginning of the epidemic. The hastiness of
the drafting of these statutes makes them less than ideal. Many are
vague, thereby creating the danger of selective enforcement against high
risk groups. Others prohibit conduct that has been medically demon-
strated not to transmit HIV, thereby failing some of the social objectives
of criminal law: to educate the public as to risky behavior and to en-
courage people to modify their behavior.2 94 This Note proposes a model
statute which avoids the weaknesses and injustice of laws now in force
around the world.
First, a model statute should require the state to prove the accused
knew that he or she was HIV-positive at the time of the conduct in ques-
tion. Establishing that the accused "should have known" is not
enough,295 because otherwise there is too great a danger that the moral
judgement of the factflnder will result in discriminatory treatment of un-
popular groups.296 Second, the state must show that the accused was
counseled by a health care professional or public health official not to
engage in high risk sexual or needle-sharing behavior. This requirement
could be realized by requiring that test sites counsel persons who have
tested positive, on either a confidential or an anonymous basis, upon the
receipt of any positive test results.
Second, to prove the requisite mental state for punishing conduct as
a felony, the state must establish that the accused purposely intended to
infect another. Otherwise, the conduct should be punished as a misde-
meanor. The purpose of the law is to set behavioral boundaries to pre-
vent the transmission of disease, not to be overly concerned with moral
judgment and culpability.2 97
Third, a model statute must be clear in the definition of behavior
293. Laurie, supra note 215, at 312.
294. Id at 313.
295. This should not discourage people from being tested because new drugs have in-
creased the life expectancy of people with HIV, so the medical benefits of being tested early
and often outweigh the disincentive of a statute basing criminal liability on knowledge of HIV
infection. See Hermann, supra note 100, at 375.
296. See Gostin, supra note 104, at 1054.
297. Id
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which is to be controlled, so offenses should be narrow and clearly de-
fined.298 The contact must be of a type epidemiologically demonstrated
to transmit HIV. The activities proscribed should be limited to anal/
genital, vaginal/genital, and possibly oral/genital299 contact that involves
an exchange of semen, blood, or vaginal fluids only.3°°
Finally, in an attempt to eliminate the danger of selective enforce-
ment, the statute should only be enforced if a victim complains to law
enforcement authorities. The requirement of a victim's complaint pre-
vents prosecutors from rounding up and charging members of high risk
groups.
Several affirmative defenses must be provided for by a model statute.
First, consent by the partner after full disclosure of the risks associated
with the activity should be a defense. Second, the use of appropriate
barrier protection against the exchange of bodily fluids, unless the con-
tact was for the purpose of conceiving a child, should be a defense.
Third, it should also be a defense that the accused was given bona fide
medical advice either that he or she was noninfectious at the time of the
contact in question, or that the activity engaged in was not a high risk
one.
There is a growing consensus among public health authorities that if
the criminal law is to be used at all to help prevent the spread of HIV,
then a narrowly focused, nonpunitive approach is preferable. 01 A stat-
ute encompassing such ideas will prove to be both more effective than,
and free from the problems of, the statutes now in force in the United
States and in the other nations discussed in this Note.
VII. CONCLUSION
The efficacy of the criminal law of the United States in stemming the
spread of HIV is likely to be limited. Public health measures that edu-
cate the public and encourage those at risk to come forward to be tested
and counseled will be much more successful in preventing the spread of
HIV. There will, however, be cases where individuals, knowing that they
are infected, still choose to engage in behavior that risks the infection of
others. In these cases, criminal prosecution is entirely appropriate.
Traditional criminal offenses are ill-suited to these situations. Properly
drafted HIV-specific statutes provide a more legitimate and effective
298. Howie & Webb, supra note 215, at 45, 46.
299. Studies have shown that receptive oral-genital contact has an extremely limited risk
for seroconversion. See Kingsley, supra note 73, at 348.
300. As well as needle sharing.
301. See REPORT, supra note 101, at 130.
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means for criminalizing HIV-transmitting behavior. The HIV-specific
statutes must not be vague or overbroad and must not be used for the
purpose of selectively prosecuting and harassing members of high risk
groups.

